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Abstract
This paper discusses the adjustment of large firms in France, in particular how they
regionalised their production structures in the 1980s. Throughout the "Golden Age,"
large firms had geographically reorganised their activities: strategic planning
remained in Paris, while the actual production was decentralised into the provinces,
primarily to address cost and labour conflict issues. A "proto-regionalised" production
system was the result.
When the large firms then faced a serious profitability crisis in the 1980s, and the
traditional state-financed way out of the problems was no longer available, they saw
in these proto-regional production systems a chance to become more competitive. In
order to make the necessary changes, they relied on the decentralisation policies of
the governments in the 1980s. Using the examples of technology and training policy,
the paper demonstrates how the large firms used the second-order effects of the
new policies as a means to modernise their own operations.
Zusammenfassung
Thema der vorliegenden Analyse ist die Frage, wie sich Großunternehmen in
Frankreich im Verlauf der achtziger Jahre an stärker regionalisierte
Produktionsstrukturen angepaßt haben. Während der "goldenen" sechziger und
siebziger Jahre hatte sich ein "proto-regionalisiertes" Produktionsmodell
herausgebildet: die strategische Planung blieb in Paris konzentriert, die Produktion
wurde an kostengünstigere und weniger konfliktträchtige Standorte in der Provinz
ausgelagert. In der tiefgreifenden Rentabilitätskrise in den frühen achtziger Jahren
sahen die Großunternehmen in diesen Standorten eine Chance, ihre
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu steigern. Deswegen kamen ihnen die politischen Initiativen
der verschiedenen Regierungen in dieser Zeit für eine stärkere Dezentralisierung in
wichtigen Politikfeldern sehr entgegen. Am Beispiel der regionalen Technologiepolitik
und der regionalen Bildungspolitik wird gezeigt, wie die Großunternehmen die
Nebeneffekte dieser auf die Stärkung der Regionen zielenden Politikansätze für ihre
Modernisierung nutzten.
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11. Introduction
This paper addresses a problem which has occupied a central place on the
agenda of French policy-makers since the early 1980s and has been heavily
studied by social scientists: How does a country modernise its industry to meet
the types of challenges of today’s volatile world markets when it cannot fall
back on Italian-style industrial districts or similar solutions as found in south-
western Germany –i.e. dense networks of dynamic small and medium-sized
companies (SME henceforth)– as is the case in France? The quick fix –the
strong French state simply ”makes” these districts through highly focused
development policies– appears impossible, since such decentralisation policies
require, beside a strong state, also strong non-state actors in the regions-to-be-
developed, to carry through the reforms, and for a variety of historical reasons,
precisely those were missing.
This paper is part of a larger body of recent "revisionist" work that is highly
critical of the earlier descriptions of these district-type flexible adjustment
patterns. It claims that French industry has adopted a very different path, which
relies on just the opposite characteristics: hierarchy and dependence instead of
equality and autonomy. Between 1985 and 1995, French industry passed
through a profound adjustment process, and the large firms –the same “lame
ducks” of the Giscard era (Berger 1981), which were supposedly kept alive
solely by the “ambulance actions of the state” (Cohen 1989)– were at the heart
of this. In response to external shocks and internal crises, they reorganised
their ties with owners, workforce, and suppliers, while neutralising the radical
and militant labour unions. As a result of this reorganisation, French industry
was considerably “leaner” at the end of the 1980s. Some companies employed
only half the workforce compared to the late 1970s, the workers that remained
are better trained and increasingly put their skills to use in production, while the
relations with suppliers are state-of-the-art, involving sophisticated
computerised procurement, just-in-time delivery and quality management
systems. In short, from the outside, many French companies have modernised
their operations profoundly; yet in no way was this modernisation based on
what appeared to be one of its preconditions –dynamic small firms.
Hence the puzzle to be solved for a proper understanding of industrial
change in France during the 1980s: How could French industry modernise
given that it was unable to rely on the dynamic small firm sector that proved so
crucial in other countries? The answer, in its simplest form, is that it did not
have to. In France, the large firms were able to reorganise precisely because
there was no dynamic small firm sector; this allowed them to avoid being
2pushed into an adjustment path which took into account the interests of the
small firms, as in many ways large firms in Germany were. Yet this also implied
that the large firms could force the smaller ones into reorganising in ways that
would fit their own needs. The possibility of this outcome was therefore
embedded in the institutional development of French industry, analogous to
how other possible adjustment paths, such as the Italian districts and Baden-
Württemberg in Germany, may have been a product of the evolution of Italian
or German industry and industrial relations.
Part 2 develops this argument in detail. Section 2.1 discusses why there
are no industrial districts in France. The answer provided is straightforward:
they were the victims of the postwar modernisation policies, which favoured the
large firms. In this version, the story is well-known since it figures in all the
accounts of France’s extraordinary modernisation in the 1950s and 1960s.
However, there is a suppressed world underneath the conventional story, not at
odds with it, but which provides the necessary complement to understand
recent developments. This is discussed in section 2.2, which treats the
geographic organisation of production in the large firm-organised France of the
Golden Age. In that period, and accelerated after May 1968, large firms began
to relocate production sites away from the highly industrialised north-west of the
country (Ile-de-France and Nord-Pas de Calais) to other parts of the territory:
Bretagne, Normandie, Franch-Comté, Rhône-Alpes, Toulouse, the Provence,
etc. In need of suppliers, they set up what could be called ”proto-regional”
production networks in those areas, which included their most important
suppliers, but did not require a reorganisation of production to make full use of
the suppliers’ resources. In fact, the ”regional” dimension was almost an
accident, solely guided by the search for a cheap and docile labour force.
Section 2.3. then moves fast forward to the mid-1980s. At that moment, French
industry passes –in part reflecting the culmination of the French model of
organisation– through a serious cost crisis, and in a desperate attempt to
rapidly change their cost structure, large firms export as much as possible of
their adjustment costs to the suppliers. They lay off large sections of their
workforce, using the generous state-financed early retirement system as a way
to cushion the blow to the workers and unions, and they impose previously
unseen flexibility on their suppliers, mostly by means of the sudden requirement
of just-in-time delivery (which shifts the cost of storing fixed capital as inventory
onto the supplier). At this point, the latently existing regional production
structures are resuscitated by the large firms, who see this as an opportunity to
rethink their internal organization, lower costs, and upgrade their dedicated
local supplier network(s) in one move. Proto-regionalisation thus changes into
regionalisation.
Part 3 discusses how the large firms accomplished this. What was the
institutional hardware for this reorganisation of production? The answer
provided is that they find this technology in the government policies of the
1980s, who aimed to favour the region as a more relevant unit of government
3operations. Section 3.1. discusses how originally these policies were intended
as ways to provide regions with some (what are now called in economics)
”endogenous growth” capacities (see Duchéneault 1995: 417 for the use of this
term)–a stated public goal in which the policies essentially failed– and then how
they recieve a second lease on life after being „hijacked“ (I cannot think of a
better term) by the large firms and remoulded to fit their own needs. Regional
government policies in different areas, of which this paper discusses technology
(section 3.2.) and training (3.3.), thus all pass, after the first failure, through the
large firms the second time around. The end result of these different adaptation
processes are the hierarchically organised autarchic regional production
networks found all over France today. Section 3.4. puts this discussion in a
somewhat broader perspective by examining the threads common to the three
areas. Part 4 concludes.
2. Small firms, large firms and industrial restructuring in
France
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of French industry’s adjustment path in the
1980s, is that it did not follow a version of the industrial district success recipe
proposed by many authors to describe developments in other countries (Courlet
and Pecqueur 1992; Ganne 1992; Ganne, Michelsons et al. 1993). Whereas in
Germany and Italy, locally embedded versions of the industrial districts re-
emerged in response to the developments of the 1960s and 70s, France simply
lacked such districts to begin with. Both the relations between small and large
firms, and between small firms and other small firms, remain organised around
the most important obstacle to the construction of industrial districts: the
absence of trust. Against such a social and cultural background, it should come
as no surprise that the renaissance of dormant local industrial structures under
new economic conditions, as in Italy and Germany, did not take place.
After discussing the demise of existing regional economic orders after the
Second World War, this section continues with a discussion of how a new,
subordinate type of regional industrial model developed in the 1950s and the
1960s, centered around the large firms, which, during the large firms’
reorganisation of the 1980s, was mobilised by the latter and led to the type of
autarchic local industrial systems that we know today.
2.1. Why are there no industrial districts in France?
Why are there no industrial districts in France? Weren’t there any to begin with,
and is this what needs explaining? Or is the right mix of cultural-institutional
4conditions –lack of trust, social capital, or of independent social actors such as
trade associations simply too important an obstacle to planned change, even in
a country with a ”strong state” like France who supposedly would be able to
marshall the resources necessary for such a shift in policy (Baudry 1994; Levy
1994; Lorenz 1992)?
The first of these answers is entirely at odds with the particulars of the
French case. Only fifty years ago, at the end of the Third Republic, France was
populated by many of these locally embedded industrial systems, almost to the
point of over-population: the „système Motte,“ groupings of small firms in the
North (see Piore & Sabel 1984; Sabel & Zeitlin 1985), the shoe and clothing
factories in the Cholet area, the paper industry in the Ardèche, or the textile
districts in the Vosges (Ganne 1992). They were, in fact, as can be deduced
from the descriptions of these districts, the industrial-geographic expression of
what Hoffmann (1963) labeled the Republican synthesis: regional, quasi-
corporatist groupings of small firms who secured, through a wide arsenal of
mutualist structures, each other’s survival, thus creating important obstacles to
any fundamental modernisation of industry.
Rather than expressions of local dynamism, which is what we now
associate with industrial districts, the industrial districts under the Third
Republic were reservoirs of traditionalism (Ganne 1992). The postwar
modernising coalition within the state (Hall 1986; Shonfield 1965; Zysman
1977) therefore deliberately eliminated them. For the planners of the Fourth
and Fifth Republics, industrial districts actually hindered industrial progress:
firms were too small to be efficient, and too preoccupied with their short-term
survival, to be modern. The large firms, many of which were directly or indirectly
controlled by the state, were the preferred partners of the modernisers, and at
the same time that their policies toward the small firms attempted to kill the
latter, thesepolicies were very much in favour of the large firms. The
governments secured their markets through protectionist policies and home-
made Keynesianism, and made available a wide array of institutional tools for
the latter to stabilise their environment. This modernising view simply left no
room for industrial districts.
The exceptions, i.e. those that survived, prove the point. Despite all the
modernist destructive zeal, some pre-war industrial districts fared better than
others. The area around Cholet, for example (50 km south-east of Nantes) was
and remained a center of shoe manufacturing –a ”true” industrial district. The
same is true of the Anjou (around Angers, 90 km east of Nantes) and in the
Vendée (the department south of Nantes) (Minguet 1985). All these areas
retained their district-like characteristics because of a peculiarity, in part
foreshadowed by their geographical location. They share a particular socio-
political history, which helps explain their survival: at the time of the Revolution,
they were ”white,” i.e. anti-revolutionary, royalist and catholic areas (in
5opposition to Nantes, which was the local headquarters of the Revolution and
firmly integrated into the French state), and retained this only partially
integrated character afterwards.1
Similar social and political antecedents explain the persistence of district-
like structures in the Jura (a watchmaking district close to the Swiss border) or
around Oyonnax (plastics, in the Lyon area). Rather than the ”Catholic”
exceptionalism, it is the left-libertarian (anarchist-socialist) tradition in these
regions which set them apart from the broader French picture. Different from
but analogous to the Anjou-Cholet area, here as well, industrial development
took a different turn from the dominant French model, emphasising the growth
of craft-based industries rather than mass production (Ganne 1992: 321-323).
It is precisely this kind of regional exceptionalism, expressed through
political autonomy and cultural specificities, which explains the somewhat a-
typical industrial development of these areas in the postwar era. In other words,
their incomplete integration into the French state, and into the dominant French
industrial model, explains why they persist(ed), and how they could become the
basis for a dynamic regional development model which is much closer to the
Italian districts. But –and this is critical for a proper assessment– they are
exceptions. The large mass production firm was the norm in France, and craft-
based industries gradually disappeared throughout the postwar era.2
Industrial districts may be unable to re-emerge, since they were destroyed;
yet that does not preclude the possibility that they could be ”created” through
political intervention which recombines previously existing resources in novel
ways, as appeared to have been, to some extent at least, the case in Baden-
Württemberg (Herrigel 1993). By using existing, perhaps even traditional
resources in ways for which they were not designed, in unforeseen
combinations, political authorities (in the broadest sense, i.e. including local
                                                          
1 To give just one example of how these areas remain, to this day, less integrated into France than others:
Philippe de Villiers, a very conservative anti-European politician, is the most important political figure in
the Vendée, and cherishes this cultural heritage with great bravura (see also Renard 1995). Such historical
political exceptionalism obviously does not translate into distinct patterns of industrial development in a
mechanical way. At least one author has tried to understand the regional development in the Vendée
within this broader religious-political trajectory (Clenet s.d.) and he indeed concludes that the nature of
regional integration into the larger political unit France helps understand local industrial development. A
recent study, to which Michel Crozier lent his support, evaluated the Vendée’s industry (Bovais and
Desmedt 1992).
2 To avoid misunderstandings: the French state did everything, of course, to save its traditional sector
from perishing, as Berger and Piore 1980 convincingly demonstrated. The argument developed here about
the elimination of small firm districts, is not at odds with this point. The industrial districts were not
populated by these firms –garages, bakeries, wine and cheese farmers, silk clothing manufacturers,
etc.(see also De Ferrière on the luxury goods industry)– but by manufacturing firms which were, in most
of their operations, pre-industrial rather than modern, and posed an obstacle to the economic goals of the
French governments. In other words, the French state devised policies to protect both very small, non-
industrial firms and very large industrial firms. The group in between was the demographic basis of the
districts, and those the state tried to eliminate.
6governments, interest groups and other intermediary associations) would be
able to create a functional substitute to the institutional hardware necessary for
a re-emergence of industrial districts (Sabel 1993b; Sabel and Zeitlin 1996
(forthcoming)).
To a large extent this captures precisely what the French state tried to do in
some areas. Reinterpreting Silicon Valley in light of the French experience
(Greffe 1992: 29), the state tried to create some high-tech industrial district-type
regions in Rhône-Alpes, around Montpellier and in the vicinity of many large
and medium-sized cities. There is presumable no French city with some claim
to fame, which does not proudly display a ”technopôle.“ The basic idea behind
the technopoles is to bring together, in the same geographical area and
financially and logistically supported by the local governments through a
publicly-run ”enterprise center” and tax advantages, small firms that are
potential leaders in new technologies. Thus the local governments have, in
principle, the means to ”create” high-tech industrial districts by attracting
innovative firms, and then put some of their financial and institutional weight
behind them through the local economic development agencies.3
However, leaving aside a few minor exceptions, these high-tech parks
rarely amount to anything more than a local ”post-industrial” settlement,
populated by firms in search of cheap land, new technical and traffic
infrastructure, and tax breaks. The famous ”local knowledge,” which Marshall
saw as perhaps the most important ”soft” feature of industrial districts, and to
which, in the spirit of a non-exclusive public good, all firms contribute, is simply
absent or, at best, marginal to their operations. (Becattini 1991; Brusco 1986).
The two other examples are considerably better-chosen to discuss the
creation of industrial districts through state policies. Both Rhône-Alpes and the
area around Montpellier are relatively well-defined regional economies which
specialise in high-tech products and services. Yet the fate of Rhône-Alpes –the
area roughly ranging from Grenoble over Lyon to St Etienne– remains heavily
tied to the large firms in the region: Hewlett-Packard, Schneider, Thomson, ...
around Grenoble (Courlet and Pecqueur 1992), and the petrochemical giants
around Lyon.  These large firms act in many regards as industrial anchors to
the region, by providing employment stability and securing the local industrial
tissue through their supplier policies. As I will argue below, these are precisely
the defining features of contemporary regional economic development in
France. Montpellier, finally, remains as a proper example of a ”new” high-tech
industrial district –yet on its own, almost like a cathedral in the desert (Storper
and Harrison 1992).    If one considers the amount of political energy and tax
money spent on these industrial policies over the last decade and a half, one
                                                          
3 The links with the rest of the French state apparatus, and especially its economic development agencies
and international trade office, can then be used, in addition to the local tax breaks, to give firms a
competitive advantage in foreign markets.
7should wonder why, even with such a strong state, the outcomes were so poor.
The answer —neo-Toquevillians argue— is precisely the lack of mutual trust of
the pertinent actors in the regions, and hence the absence of a strong social
bearer to implement the policies (Levy 1994).4
Despite the obvious economic benefits associated with small-firm based
industrial districts, and despite the government policies which were designed to
create such dynamic high-tech small-firm regions, France therefore entered and
left the 1980s without them. Even the most benign assessment of new regional
production structures would be forced to admit that the government policies
towards the regions failed in most of their stated goals. French industry
remained the fief of the large, mass production firm, in the 1980s as much as in
the 1950s.
Underneath the appearance of total large-firm victory, however, another
movement was underway. As the large firms grew, they decentralised their
production, frequently supported by state policies, into the provinces, and thus
laid the basis for a later regionalisation of production.
2.2. The proto-regionalisation of production during the trentes
glorieuses
As the 1960s moved on, and the previously existing industrial districts one after
another disappeared under the steamroller of the modernising state, a different
movement was under way at the same time. Since large firms grew rapidly
under the postwar French growth regime, they were expanding production and
building production sites. For two very different reasons, the regions where they
originally were located –Ile-de-France (the area around Paris) and the Northern
regions against the Belgian border– turned out to be difficult places for further
expansion. In search of a combination of room to expand and more peaceful
industrial relations, the large firms left the industrial heartland and relocated in
the provinces.
The first reason for this exodus was geographical. Precisely at the time that
mass production became a success in France, the Paris area, where many
plants originally were located, became saturated with other “space-intensive”
activities such as public services, banking and other administrative activities. As
a result, the square footage needed for an expansion of mass production
activities, was no longer available and firms were forced to look for alternatives.
                                                          
4 Note how similar this argument is to Putnam's (Putnam 1993) famous argument on local democracy in
Italy: the presence or absence of "social capital" —associational life.
8The car industry is, as so often in France, a case in point (Loubet 1995). As
early as 1951, Citroen, the car maker, moved out of the Paris bassin into the
Rennes area in Bretagne. The reasons the company gave for this move were
two-fold. The first, and without doubt the most important practical consideration,
was simply that an expansion within Paris, supposedly the preferred option, had
become impossible. The success of the 2 CV required space far above what
the capital could offer, and Citroen was already using its plants in and around
Paris at the limits of their planned capacity. The famous Javel plant on the
Seine in the center of Paris and the Levallois-Michelet plant just outside the
periphérique were literally overflowing, and more room was impossible to find
there (Caro 1993).
In longer-term perspective, however, the second reason, which has to do
with the labour force, was at least as important an argument as the lack of
expansion space. As France grew, so did Paris, the center of the country in
every respect, and the labour market in Ile-de-France became unusually (and
unpleasantly) tight for large companies. In Bretagne, however, where
agriculture was slowly declining (Berger 1972), there was an abundant
workforce. This not only meant that labour was relatively cheap there; because
of the relative absence of other industrial employers, it also meant that the
practice of poaching trained workers was quite uncommon. Yet the political
argument was probably the most important. Moving production to Bretagne
meant above all, in the French context, moving production out of the seedbeds
of social unrest that the northern part of the country had become. The Breton
workers recruited by Citroen were unfamiliar with all kinds of habits and
customs of industrial workers (Le Bourdonnec 1996: 147). They were perhaps
not trained (formés), but that had to be weighed against the fact that they were
not yet “déformés” either by socialisation into the industrial world (Caro 1993:
p.29-30).
When the local government offered subsidies, tax breaks, a renewed
infrastructure and helped selecting suppliers, the company rapidly decided in
favour of the Rennes location. A few years later, satisfied with the experiences
of the first plant, Citroen even opened a second plant: the Rennes workforce, in
the words of a local manager, was “numerous and cheap, ..., docile, and
showed a spirit which created a calm social climate.” (cited in Caro 1993: 48,
own translation).
A similar story can be told for the other car companies, and for other
industries as well. Renault did exactly what Citroen did when their plants in the
immediate vicinity of Paris were unable to accommodate the jump in production
during those years and relocated in Normandie and other areas in the 1950s
(Oberhauser 1987; Oberhauser 1988). Peugeot followed a somewhat different
path, but ended up in the same place: the company settled in Mulhouse and
Sochaux precisely because it did not want to be located in the north in the first
9place (Loubet 1995; Pialoux 1996). In other industries as well, delocalisations to
low-wage, socially peaceful areas took place. Toulouse became the center for
the aerospace industry, and the consumer electronics firm Moulinex, followed
by other electronics producers, became the single most important employer in
lower Normandie (Loubet 1995; Pialoux 1996: 27-28). In short, during those
years, France witnessed a true decentralisation of production into the
provinces.
Yet alongside this decentralisation of the production structure, the center
took firmer control over strategic issues. Even though the actual production
sites increasingly were moved into the provinces, the corporate headquarters,
strategy, planning and R&D departments of many firms remained in the Paris
area. The engineers in Ile-de-France thus developed new products, designed
new production methods, and decided on market strategy, while the newly
recruited workforce far away from Paris executed these orders (Baleste 1995;
Veltz 1996). The firm-level Taylorism so characteristic of French companies in
those years (Crozier 1964; Friedmann 1956) was mirrored in a geographical
Taylorism which physically and socially separated conception and execution
(Veltz 1996).
Underneath the centralised large firm-world, in short, a different order
existed, which integrated the large firm and the small firm world, and linked
Paris to the provinces. The division of labour was clear: designing the
disclosure of the French territory was a matter for the planners in Paris;
implementing it on the terrain was a matter for the large firms. Frequently, these
large firms became for the local communities where they were implanted the
only (or at least by far the most important) window into the wider world. In much
the same way as the village notables constituted the most important political
link with the center, the large firm became the prime medium for the economic
integration of different regions within France.
2.3. The search for flexible adjustment in the 1980s: from proto-
regionalisation to dependent regional economies
Gradually, and partly in response to the social unrest of May 1968 and the early
1970s, this dual territorial industrial structure obtained a more permanent
character. In order to safeguard production during strikes, firms now also began
to experiment more seriously with a reorganisation of production through sub-
contracting out larger parts of production with local suppliers  (Berger and Piore
1980; Linhart 1981; Sabel 1982; Salvati 1981). As a result, the proto-regional
production order slowly consolidated into established regional production
networks.
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Fast forward to the 1980s then, when the French large firm-led model faces
considerable strain, as a result of the sudden catastrophic financial situation
that many large firms find themselves in. In part as a result of increased
competition from new mass producers, but more even a product of the
exhaustion of the French growth model’s micro-economic and organisational
bases (Boyer 1979), French industry as a whole, almost regardless of sector or
product, faced a competitive crisis of a scale unseen before (and since) in
OECD countries. Between 1980 and 1984, the “fleurons” of French industry
collapsed under their own weight: unable, under the inflationary growth regime
of the 1960s and 70s, to retain capital for investment, they found themselves in
a structural crisis by the early 1980s (Glyn 1995). A few examples: Peugeot SA
(quasi-bankrupt in 1983 after its acquisition of Citroen, Talbot, and its financial
stake in bankrupt Chrysler), Renault (FF 12 Mrd loss in 1984, and therefore
virtually bankrupt), the steel companies Usinor and Sacilor (FF 4 Mrd loss in
1986), Thomson (FF 2 Mrd loss in 1982). Other large firms went bankrupt and
disappeared forever from the industrial map: Creusot-Loire (Cohen 1989), LIP
(Levy 1994) and the shipyards of Nantes. In short, French industry was on the
verge of total collapse (Schmidt 1996; Smith 1990).
Ironically, the economic policies of the socialist government after the U-turn
of March 1983 exacerbated the situation of the large firms. Since the
companies had been unable to build up financial reserves in the previous
years, and relied on banks for credit, they faced a gigantic debt burden. In the
early 1980s, debt/equity ratios were higher in France than in any other OECD
country (Taddéi and Coriat 1993), and as a result the macro-economic
stabilisation policies, involving high interest rates to fight inflation, and the
decision to remain within the EMS with a stable currency (Cameron 1996;
Halimi 1992; Halimi 1996) sanctioned the already highly uncompetitive large
firms. In order to find a solution to this severely uncomfortable problem, large
firms had to devise ways to reduce costs both rapidly and structurally. It was
against this macro-economic background that the previously existing but
unused regional production structures were mobilised in support of the large
firms’ adjustment path.
Whereas before the suppliers were regarded primarily as solutions to
internal labour problems, this idea was extended so that they played a core role
in the large firms’ search for external flexibility as well. And in this new role, the
existing regional production networks performed a different function than they
did before. First, in order to obtain increased flexibility, large firms gradually
introduced (or better: imposed) just-in-time delivery systems. Given the nature
of the large firms’ cost problems (first and foremost very high debt, see Hall
1986; Zysman 1983), immediate solutions for reduction of capital costs were
eagerly sought, and shifting the burden of carrying inventory onto the suppliers
was a quick and easy way out –the equivalent, almost, of appealing to the
National Employment Funds in order to finance massive lay-offs (Salais 1988;
Salais 1992). The second step built on the first: in order to get the most out of
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the JIT delivery structures, large firms began to impose stricter quality norms
upon their suppliers. As a result, suppliers now undergo, with great regularity,
quality audits, quality checks, visits by quality consultants, etc. (Baudry 1995;
Gorgeu and Mathieu 1993; Gorgeu and Mathieu 1996a; Lorenz 1993).
However, the large firms also provides them with help in upgrading quality,
training workers, obtaining licenses, or technology transfer. The third step,
finally, consisted of attempts by the large firms to merge their suppliers into
larger firms, capable of taking over product development, and providing training
alone, without help from the large firms (Hancké 1996). Gradually, therefore,
the suppliers became a central piece of the large firms’ adjustment strategies.
What is described here as a variant of an almost generic story of the
reorganisation of small and large firm relationships in all OECD countries, takes
on an entirely different meaning in light of the above narrative on proto-
regionalisation. France witnessed, indeed, the transition from local production
networks into full-fledged regional industrial systems. Through all the technical
links described above, the suppliers became a part of the large firms’
operations, and therefore more dependant upon them. Yet at the same time
these policies also made the suppliers stronger in the tasks they were
supposed to perform. Thus, by integrating the suppliers’ activities closely into
their own operations, the large firms increasingly began to treat them as
prolongations of their own production operations in the regions without paying
the prize in large firm loyalty to the supplier that it would in other, more
symmetric systems (see Aoki 1988; Sabel 1993a). The technical integration,
which offered the weak small firms ways to upgrade, therefore tied the latter’s
fate more closely to that of the large firms; what emerged were autarchic
regional production networks, hierarchically organised around large firms.
The examples discussed above and updated, add the necessary empirical
detail to this general argument. Both the areas around Rennes (Citroen) and
Sochaux (Peugeot) –but the same is to a large extent true of Flins, Sandouville
or Cléon (Renault)– are constructed like cartwheels, with the large car
assembly firm in the middle, and the most important JIT suppliers within an
hour or so on the freeway (Gorgeu and Mathieu 1994; Gorgeu and Mathieu
1996b). All car manufacturers have installed a wide variety of instruments to
monitor and correct supplier quality (Gorgeu and Mathieu 1991; Gorgeu and
Mathieu 1995). The local industrial structure that thus emerges, has a virtual
employment monopoly in the region, which explains the relative willingness by
local authorities to accommodate the wishes of the car assemblers (Auto-
Hebdo 1992; Gorgeu and Mathieu 1996b; Pialoux 1996).
The electrical household appliances sector fared in roughly the same way.
In 1969, Moulinex had two large production sites in lower Normandie, one in
Caen, another in Alençon, which made all the parts and then supplied these to
the smaller final assembly plants elsewhere in Normandie (La Vie française 20
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June 1969). When the crisis hit in the mid-1980s (a crisis which combined
organisational problems and international competition), the company started
laying off workers in the smaller plants and (slowly) turned to external
subcontractors (Le Monde Affaires 7 March 1987). In the summer of 1996,
Moulinex announced massive lay-offs, which reverberated throughout and
beyond lower Normandie, almost until Angers —some 200 km away. In several
production sites situated in an area of some 100 km around Caen, Moulinex
directly and indirectly (the company has over 2000 suppliers in the area)
employed the bulk of industrial workers in the region, and the social plan had
an enormous social impact on the entire region (Le Monde 17 June 1996;
Libération 16 June 1996).
The same or a similar story can be told for the chemical industry just south
of Lyon and around Marseille; for the aerospace industry in Toulouse; or the tire
maker Michelin in Clermont-Ferrand (see Baleste 1995; Baleste, Boyer et al.
1993 for these vignettes). Sometimes the storyline differs from the one above in
details –for example, Clermont-Ferrand always was highly dependant upon
Michelin, even 60 years ago, and Aérospatiale located in Toulouse before the
Second World War; and the aerospace company destroyed its existing supplier
basis in order to create a new one (Morin 1994)– but the basic outcome is
always the same: in their search for cost reductions and flexibility, the large
firms turned France into a collection of hierarchically organised autarchic
regional production systems. The opposite, in short, of what is commonly
understood as industrial districts.
How exactly did the large firms achieve such a reorganisation? How did
they accomplish the authoritarian modernization of their suppliers and their
subsequent quasi-integration? The answer lies in the failed government
policies. While the decentralisation policies –in the largest sense, i.e. including
administrative decentralisation, economic and industrial policy, and training
programs– failed in their stated goals of creating dynamic industrial districts,
they did offer large firms a novel institutional framework for their modernisation.
How the large firms “hijacked” the government policies and used them to their
own advantage, is the topic of the next section.
3. The institutional technology: the regional policies of the
1980s
Large firms may want to reorganise, yet there are good reasons to believe that
they may simply not be able to. The history of French industry since WW II is
punctuated by and organised around protectionism, state aid and subsidies,
and as late as the 1970s and early 1980s, the state was still the central actor in
French economic life. In fact, judging from the policies of the first half of the
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decade, it was almost certain that any reorganisation of industry would have to
take place through the state (Berger 1981; Cohen 1989). In order to move out
of the low-trust, low-tech equilibrium in which they were trapped after the
French version of Fordist mass production had run its course, the large firms
therefore needed more than just goodwill and detailed plans. What they needed
was an institutional framework onto which they hooked their new needs and
that they could use to implement policies which dealt with these. Conversely,
their needs had, to some extent at least, be redefined with exactly these
institutional starting points in mind.
The policy framework of the 1980s regionalisation policies5 provided
exactly what the large firms needed. After these had lived their first life, and
either had entirely failed in their initial goals, or had turned out to be primarily
expensive employment programs for the administrations charged with their
implementation, they were picked up again by the large firms, who had
decentralised production into the provinces during the better part of the trente
glorieuses. Through a re-interpretation of these policies in light of their own
organisational capacities and needs, the large firms were able to redeploy
them, often in ways unforeseen –but nonetheless eagerly supported– by the
policy makers. This objective coalition between the large firms and the policy
makers is relatively easy to understand. It was in the large firms’ interests, since
these “second chance” policies allowed them to readjust using public money
and under the authority of the state; for the policy makers, on the other hand, it
meant that the source of failure the first time around –the lack of a strong non-
state actor in the regions to implement the reforms– was by-passed. The large
firms could now act as the institutional vehicle for change.
Before developing this argument, the section that follows quickly reviews
the evolution of regional policies in France first, and the policies of the 1980s in
particular, with special reference to the fields which are relevant for the
reorganisation of the links between large and small firms –industrial and
technology policy and training– and why and how they failed. The final part then
discusses how, after their first life, these policies got a second lease on life, but
not until an implicit bargain was struck between the state and the large firms,
who reappropriated them and were allowed to reorganise the policies in such a
way that they became solutions to their own problems.
                                                          
5 “Regionalisation” refers here to the generic process of transferring policy-making capacity, in its
broadest sense, from the center (Paris) to the regions. Some confusion is possible, since in France the term
“régionalisation” is almost exclusively used for the policies of Deferre, i.e. the administrtaive
decentralisation, which revamped, and thus de facto created the current version of the régions.
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3.1. The failure of decentralisation and the reappearance of the
large firms
The origins of the 1980s decentralisation date back as far as the 1950s and
60s, when the rapid industrialisation of France risked creating profound regional
inequalities. While the area north of Paris, Nord-Pas de Calais and Picardie (i.e.
roughly everything between Paris, the Channel, Reims and the Belgian border)
rapidly became France’s industrial heartland, the rest of the territory equally
rapidly turned into an economic desert (Gravier 1947). In order to correct past
and avoid future territorial inequalities, the French state created, in 1963, a
central agency for regional development, the DATAR (Montricher 1995), and
targeted industrial development, by means of subsidies and other supportive
policies, in areas beyond the Nord-Pas de Calais and Ile de France. Thus the
policies supported the previously discussed general decentralisation of
production by the large firms during this period.
After the Left electoral victory of 1981, decentralisation and regional
industrial policy received a new impetus. Decentralisation —despite the
Jacobinism that is commonly, and historically somewhat incorrectly (since it
was Napoleon and not the revolutionaries of 1789 who imposed the centralised
state structure), associated with the French Left (see Hayward 1983)— was
one of the central points in the Left program, and after the Left’s double victory
in May and June of 1981, the government moved rapidly to push through a
series of institutional reforms that addressed this issue.
The reforms of the 1980s are strongly associated with the name of Gaston
Deferre, the then mayor of Marseille, who seized the momentum of the Left’s
electoral victory by proposing legislation that was to reshape the relationship
between Paris and the regions. The background to the reforms was at least
threefold. First, it was political: Deferre (and prime minister Mauroy, mayor of
Lille) wanted to rid large city-mayors of the central state’s irritating micro-
management; secondly, it was social, in that the reforms should be regional
development instruments aimed at reducing  the territorial inequalities that had
built up over the postwar period6; and, but only after a certain time, their
rationale became economic as well, since the policy makers realised that
France’s overall economic performance was strongly dependant upon a dense
tissue of sophisticated SMEs, and creating a local support structure for such
small firms was impossible to organise from Paris. Thus the reforms installed a
                                                          
6 A short note is in order here: presumably a combination of the country’s constitutional structure --the
unitary state-- and Parisian interests prevented the implementation of another, considerably simpler
method of reducing inequalities, such as fiscal federalism, whereby the rich areas contribute to the public
services in the poorer areas according to an (inverted) distribution key (the poorer the region, the more it
receives, as with the EU structural funds). This solution was not entirely unimaginable: electricity in
France, for example, is distributed according to this principle of “péréquation:” Since delivering electricity
is easier and cheaper in the cities, the city customers pay slightly above cost, so that the customers in the
poorer areas can pay relatively less.
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network of regional and local institutions, whose aim it was to assist small firms
in their modernisation drive and create new opportunities for economic growth
in the local communities.
The laws were passed in 1982; they gave the existing regions more
autonomy, by turning the regional assemblies (parliaments) into the most
important political actors. From then on, at least according to the law, the
president of the directly elected regional parliament was the most powerful
political-administrative figure outside Paris, above the departmental and
regional prefects, who represented the capital. The reform was crowned by
direct elections for the regional assemblies in 1986.
Analytically, the reform entailed, beside a regional extension of the
traditional financial aid to companies, a regional planning system, envisioned as
the regional pendant of national industrial policies, which implemented broad
centrally defined goals, and would operate in four areas. First, they should
encourage innovation, through the dissemination of information, and the
organisation of technology transfer and licenses. Thus regional technology
centers were founded or revamped, and the Ministry of Industry regionalised
part of its operations through the regional industry directions DRIR(E).
Secondly, regional authorities would help small firms with their search for
(export) markets; again the DRIRE, in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign
Trade, would be the institutional actor on the terrain (Greffe 1992). Third,
gradually the professional training system would be regionalised, thus allowing
the regions to adapt their schooling system to local needs. In 1992, this policy
was taken to its logical conclusion when the Five-Year Law was passed (see,
for a lengthy discussion and a first evaluation, the Comité de coordination
1996). Fourth, in the wake of the financial reform of 1984, attempts were made
to redesign the financial system in order to bring creditors closer to the under-
financed and financially isolated SMEs (see Chanel-Reynaud and Cieply 1996;
Greffe 1992). Finally, the relations between the regions and the state were
organised in the “contrats de plan” (the law of 17 July 1982), which linked
regional and central planning.
The effects of these policies have been the topic of much debate in and
writing on France.  By and large there are two positions in the evaluation
debate.  The first, which emphasises the long way that French political-
economic organisation has come since the heyday of the centralised state, is,
in all, rather optimistic (Greffe 1992; Montricher 1995; Schmidt 1990).  The
other points out how the institutional heritage associated with the central state
shines through in every success. Even when regional policies seem to yield
results, in reality, the central state reappears in another disguise (Giblin 1995;
Levy 1994). On balance, and with, perhaps, the regionalisation of the training
system as an exception  (see Hillau and Caro 1996; Lamanthe and Verdier
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1996; Mouy 1996), most authors seem to agree that the regionalisation policies
have come up short of what they promised.
Technological innovation and financing are clear cases in point. Even
though many can point at hopeful examples, there seems to be widespread
agreement that the regional authorities do an extremely bad job at providing the
type of technology expertise required by the small firms. A comparison of the
permanent background case, Germany, helps understand why: whereas in
Germany, industry plays a central role in the organisation and administration of
these programs, and has a determining say in the final outcome (Lütz 1993), in
France, industry —in any guise, i.e. as firms or industry associations— is simply
absent from the process. Hence technology policy is, one could say (with only
some exaggeration), designed in the Ministry of Industry in Paris, transferred to
the regions by the DRIRE, and carried out by sophisticated engineering
schools. The organisational interface which connects all these worlds to the
industrial world where the technologies have to be implemented, does not exist
in France.
The problem with the policies on small firm financing is very similar: SMEs
belong to a different world than financial agents. The latter want stability and
are risk-averse, whereas the former are flexible (that is precisely their
advantage over the large firms), and operate in market niches that are left by
the large firms. As a result, any solution which does not operate at different
levels simultaneously, by providing a translator of the problems of the former
into words understandable to the latter, is bound to run into problems (Hancké
and Cieply 1996; Rivaud-Danset and Salais 1992).
The difficulty was, in its most general terms, that the policies put the entire
institutional arsenal in place in the regions, but “forgot” to think of the actors
who made sure that the system also performed as designed. Why the actors
who could provide these translations between different industrial worlds
(Rivaud-Danset and Salais 1992; Salais and Storper 1993) were not there, is a
question which goes back to Tocqueville, who lamented the lack of intermediary
associations in revolutionary France (Levy 1994); the postwar state-centered
industrial and economic policy exacerbated this problem by degrading interest
groups into an extension of its own activities. As a result, when the state
wanted to decentralise its own operations, and delegate authority to groups in
civil society, there was nobody there to actually carry the policies through. The
result was, in sum, a new version of the stalemate society.
However, this final conclusion is at odds with the findings previously
reported in this paper.  Clearly something happened with the policies at the
regional level,  since the large firms reorganised their links with their suppliers
—often the very SMEs envisioned in the regional industrial policy proposals—
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in ways that were highly consistent with the policies. What happened was,
indeed, what this cryptic observation suggests: the large firms gave the regional
policies a second life, by redeploying them in light of their own needs. The large
firms, with their regional production networks, became the de facto interpretors
which connected the different worlds: the financial world, the technology
centers, the training programs and the small firms.
The large firms were able to do this, because their dominant role in the
regions, on the one hand, turned them into strong industrial and economic
actors that the regional authorities eagerly listened to, while the way they
dominated their suppliers and sub-contractors, allowed them to obtain a
tremendous amount of transparent information on the SMEs’ operations. Thus
the large firms became the interface between the regional policy apparatus and
the SMEs who were supposed to be served by the regionalisation.
Yet, importantly, becoming such an interface was far from a totally selfless
act. In order for the large firms to engage in this kind of institution-building, they
had to make sure that their actions on the whole served their interests. The
surest way to do this was to simply “hijack” the policies, and give them a very
clear goal —which, in turn, would be perfectly compatible with, or frequently
simply mirrored, the problems that they had discovered with their suppliers but
were somewhat unwilling to pay for themselves. The large firms, in other words,
used the second-order effects of the previously “failed” policies to re-build and
modernise their own supplier base.
What follows discusses two cases, which are taken from similar regional
industrial networks to the ones discussed before, and which will illustrate in
more detail what is meant here. The first deals with technology policy, while  the
second deals with further training programs. Both demonstrate how the large
firms are acting as the interface between the different worlds: between the
technology centers and the small firms, and between the small firms and the
training centers. Each time, the same mechanism is at the basis of the large
firm’s role. By virtue of the information that the large firm has on the operations
of the small firms and because of the way these large firms have access to the
regional administrations, policies can be reoriented in such a way that they
entirely fit the large firm’s goals. For the regional authorities this provides a
success case where before failure was most likely, and for the small firms it
provides a problem-oriented method for them to modernise. The large firms,
finally, get a free ride on public resources.7
                                                          
7 It is useful here to recall the words used by Andrew Shonfield (Shonfield 1965: 128) in the mid-1960s to
characterise the French political economy: “an act of voluntary collusion between senior civil servants and
senior managers of big business.”
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3.2. Technology policy : „trust is good, control is better“
In the region of Franche-Comté, in the east of the country, Peugeot (PSA), the
car maker, has the largest single factory of France. Located in Sochaux, it is an
assembly plant which employs some 20 000 people directly, and certainly over
another 20 000 indirectly. In the area, the Peugeot plants (there is another one
located in Mulhouse, in the adjacent department of Haut-Rhin) account, directly
and indirectly, for roughly two-thirds of all industrial employment (Pialoux 1996;
Le Monde 7 March 1996).
By the turn of the decade, the local engineering school ENSMM, the
University of Franche-Comté, the regional industrial development agency
DRIRE and a few other local agencies had set up a technology center that was
to provide the local SMEs with access to state-of-the-art technology.8 As part of
a wider regional evaluation study, the local authorities had identified iron and
steel surface treatment as a domain where much could be done. The industry is
extremely polluting, and therefore a good candidate for modernisation.
Furthermore, there was a social rationale for modernisation as well. In part as a
result of the working conditions, which are extremely bad, these companies can
only attract the least skilled workforce. Thus production process and labour
market reinforce each other. Theworking conditions are truly backward, as a
result of the use of production methods that date back to the early ages of
industrialisation. These companies therefore were a perfect place for
intervention along the new regional lines. Upgrading skills and standardising
quality control killed many birds with one stone: it made the industry more
competitive while upgrading technology and decreasing environmental hazards.
The idea of upgrading was not new. Over the previous years, a number of
studies had raised the issue, and had even suggested technical solutions. The
problem that the regional authorities faced was of another nature. How could
they integrate the SMEs close enough into the study and decision-making
process, so that their genuine needs were met? How could they design
programs and then implement them? And how could they convince firms to
participate in the programs? Normally, this is the type of mobilisational role that
an industry or trade association plays. The industry association acts as a
collective voice for the local firms, surveys the study and organisation process,
and convinces its local affilliates to participate. The problem in this case was
that no industry association was present, and the national one in Paris did not
bother to come to the provinces to act as the voice of industry there.
In the absence of industrial associations, the local authorities did most
themselves. They organised public hearings, surveys, and tried to identify the
                                                          
8 This example is drawn from Levy 1994: 300-317.
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response to training and quality control programs. As a result, only a fraction of
the local firms signed up for the training programs and quality courses, and
these were not even the companies that probably most needed it. Furthermore,
the firms that participated disproportionately came from the car industry, i.e.
they were suppliers to Peugeot. The metal suppliers to the watchmaking
industry, and those that treated steel as one stage of a broader in-house
production process, stayed away from the program. The reason for the former’s
high participation rate was of course their dependance upon Peugeot, who
forced them to participate, since it fitted perfectly with a technological jump that
the car maker was preparing.
At about the same time that the local authorities tried to mobilise the small
firms, Peugeot was revising its corrosion control standards, and an internal
study had suggested that perhaps the existing steel suppliers were not ready to
meet these new standards. Thus PSA commissioned, with the financial help of
the public authorities, a study at the University of Franche-Comté which would
evaluate the suppliers in light of the new corrosion standards that Peugeot was
adopting in its next generation of cars. The study found that the local suppliers
would be capable of meeting these new standards only if they upgraded the
skills of their workforce, and introduced more formalised production methods
and standardised quality control instruments.
This explains why, among the steel producers, the suppliers to the car
industry were over-represented in the technology programs. Using the regional
policy attempts, Peugeot was able to define the exact needs of its supplier firms
(through the study commissioned at the University), and then use the results to
modernise part of its supplier base with the help of the regional authorities --
and not even pay a lot for the whole thing (PSA paid FF 200 000, the regional
authorities over FF 1 Mio --Levy 1994: 308-12)! Then, in a second phase, once
the local suppliers were upgraded, Peugeot could use its direct clout over them
as a way of pushing them into sustained quality control programs to assure that
quality did not slip. The PSA purchasing department SOGEDAC is notoriously
tough with its suppliers (Gorgeu and Mathieu 1996a), and demands, as
practically every other large firm in France, that all suppliers be certified
according to ISO 9000 quality standards (Hancké 1996; Hancké and Casper
1996). Thus PSA not only determined what exactly the problems of the
suppliers were, it also managed to impose solutions —all of which, while being
to the benefit of the suppliers, was to PSA’s as well, of course.
In sum, by virtue of its central position in the region, PSA was able to turn
what was increasingly looking like a total regional policy fiasco into a relative
succes. As a result of the intervention, the regional policies were certainly
considerably better adapted to the needs of local industry than before, workers
in the supplier firms were better trained, which enabled the companies to make
better steel, and PSA got better steel and better suppliers. What PSA did, was
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simply fill the void in the policy design that resulted from the lack of strong
industrial associations. It could do so because of its pivotal role in the triangle
constituted between the large firm, the small firm and the tech center. A similar
set-up explains the second example, this time drawn from the training area.
3.3. Training policy: the customisation of public schooling
The regionalisation of training has been a hotly debated issue in France. In
response to what the country considered as a major competitiveness crisis
(Taddéi and Coriat 1993), and enviously looking at Germany, French authorities
set up a series of further training programs. For reasons that are very similar to
the establishment of technology centers, Paris decided to delegate its
implementation to the regions: in exactly the same way that the Paris
technocrats —in a move of untypical modesty— decided that they were unable
to define what the technology needs of the industries in the regions are, they
decided they were unable to tell as well how much and which training the firms
needed. Rather than guessing in the center, therefore, it would be wiser to
create structures that decentrally determined what training meant (in a centrally
defined framework, of course, since every Frenchman and -woman has the
constitutional right to the same education). This devolution of training policies
found its preliminary culmination in the Five-Year law of December 1993
(Comité de coordination 1996).
As part of this broad policy initiative, the regions started to experiment with
what are called in France “alternating learning” methods, i.e. training programs
which combine (as in Germany, the shining example) theoretical classroom
training with practical training in companies; in a similar way to what exists in
Germany, the training alternates between training proper and “real” work (i.e.
on products or services for the market).
The policies had some implementation problems, and in much the same
way as with the technology policies, the absence of strong industry associations
explains in part what these problems were. The German training system, from
which the French innovations borrowed heavily, relies on the active participation
of both employers associations and the labour unions (Streeck 1987). Thus the
French system was designed with these same actors, who were the central
interlocutors in the French collective bargaining system anyway (Jobert and
Tallard 1996; Reynaud 1978; Saglio 1995; Sellier 1984), as the administrators
of the system. Yet, for a variety of reasons, the employers’ associations and the
labour unions are in fact, despite the seemingly perfect fit between their
organisational structures and those required by the policies, not at all well-
equipped for this task.
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The first reason has to do with the very organisational structure of the
actors: the unions and the employers’ associations both are, indeed, the parties
around which the collective bargaining system and some of the parity-based co-
management structures (“structures paritaires”) in public enterprises and public
administrations, such as EDF-GDF, the Social Security system, and the SNCF
are constructed (Duclos and Le Gorrec 1994/95; Duclos and Mériaux 1996), but
these are central tasks, not regional ones (which also implies that in some of
these cases, the industry federations are not the pertinent actors anyway). The
predominance, in fact, of the central  structures is so big, that regional
structures are either non-existent, or have no autonomy, since they are
regarded as the logical local extension of the respective centers in Paris.9 Thus
the regionalised training policies had, not unlike the technology policies, no
institutional actor to put its weight behind them.
Second, further training has traditionally been something of a secondary
issue for both labour unions and employers (Gehin and Méhaut 1993; Maurice,
Sellier et al. 1988). In part, this is related to the Taylorist organisation of French
companies, which hardly encourages workers to invest in training (Crozier
1964; Linhart 1991); but it also follows from the refusal of the labour unions to
be associated with the co-management of French capitalism (Ross 1982).
When, then, in the 1980s, the company became a central arena (again), and
entepreneurial ideologies began to dominate the political debate (see the
special issue of Sociologie du Travail 1986), this took the labour unions
somewhat off guard, and the result was that the policies were implemented
without them. In short, because of both cultural and institutional reasons, the
regionalisation of further training policies was bound to be a somewhat
mitigated result.
Yet the policies were far from a complete failure, however, and in order to
understand why this is so, one needs only to look at how the regionalisation
policies in training matters articulated with the need for restructuring of the (by
then solidly decentralised production networks of the) large firms. Throughout
the 1980s decade, the workforce of large firms went through a slow but
fundamental change. A detailed analysis of requests by firms for funds to
finance their restructuring through the Fund for Industrial Modernisation (FMI)
and the National Employment Fund (FNE), clearly demonstrates that French
firms were slowly moving away from the mass markets and the traditional,
highly hierarchical structures that had accompanied this market strategy (Salais
1992). The modernisation of the companies was the result of two policies. The
first consisted of massive lay-offs, in large measure financed by the state,
whereby a disproportionate amount of older, less qualified workers was sent in
early retirement and part of the empty slots were filled with young, highly
qualified technicians (Midler and Charue 1993). The second was retraining the
existing relatively low-skilled workforce.
                                                          
9 I owe this point, with its application to training, to Olivier Mériaux.
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Because of the regional specialisation which was a result of the large firms’
territorial reorganisation, the latter immediately turned to the regional authorities
for many of their training needs. For many of the large firms, relying on the local
training institutes allowed them to off-load part of the cost onto the region, and
link their company-specific demands to the locally existing educational
institutes. Thus the regional authorities offered the large firms financing and/or
an existing infrastructure; if the training takes place in a technical school, it
(may) even result in a state-certified diploma. Given the relative weight of the
large firm, it is easy for them to influence the educational ministry to “create”
new, almost measure-made diplomas or provide the conceptual mould for the
development of training curricula; and, finally, the existing educational
infrastructure can be mobilised rapidly to upgrade the skills structure of their
suppliers.
An example will help understand this.10 The region Provence-Alpes-Côte
d’Azur (PACA), in the south-east of France, has only few large firms:
statistically, the area is the third lowest large firm-industrialised region in France
(out of 22), after Franche-Comté (the region where Peugeot —the technology
center example above—is located), and Auvergne, an almost exclusively
agricultural region, which makes excellent cheeses --and tires in the Michelin
factories.11 One steel company, a subsidiary of a large French company,
employs roughly 4000 workers (figures for 1994), and, following a rule of
thumb, is estimated to employ roughly the same number indirectly in supplier
firms. This makes the company the single most important industrial employer in
the region.
In view of a restructuring plan, the company drew up a profile of its
workforce, and came to the surprising conclusion that the majority of its
workforce lacked basic skills, and was definitely underqualified for the course
that the company was taking. Very early on, the company decided not to lay off
workers; changes in the skill structure would have to be accomplished with the
existing workforce. The first step of the requalification was simply to put all the
low-skilled workers into the regular state-organised technical education system,
in order for them to obtain the minimal educational level deemed necessary by
management.
The second step came when the company felt the need to reorient the
training program and bring it closer to the needs required in the steel industry.
Instead of general technical and vocational training, the company wanted more
industry-specific training, and, with this in mind, created, in cooperation with the
education ministry, a local training institution, whose task it was to set up
                                                          
10 This example is entirely drawn from Hildebrandt, Quack et al. 1995.
11 Michelin, the tire maker, is the only large firm in the Auvergne, located in Clermont-Ferrand, and thus is
in a virtually similar situation as Peugeot in Franche-Comté, Citroën in Rennes, Aérospatiale in Toulouse,
and the anonymous steel company in PACA.
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specialised programs, one a CAP (certificat d’aptitude professionnelle, a low-
level technical diploma), and a BEP (brevet d’études professionnelles, a higher-
level quasi-technician’s diploma).12 Both are official, state-recognised diplomas.
The training was done not in the local technical lycées, but in the company
training center, and the company sent its own engineers and foremen as
teachers.
The customisation of training policy did not stop there. As a direct result of
its own reorganisation, the large steel firm also demanded from its suppliers
that they upgrade the skills of their workforce. In a move parallell to the
colonisation of the further training program described above, the large firm used
some of the regional resources to help retrain its suppliers’ workforce: the in-
house training program offers courses in new production techniques to its
suppliers.
In short, both directly and indirectly, the large firm put many of the regional
resources to very good use —for itself, first of all, but also for its suppliers, and
therefore indirectly for the rest of the region as well. Most suprising in this short
narrative on the role of large firms in PACA is perhaps that the boundaries
between the public educational system, on the one hand, and the company-
specific training system, on the other, are permanently blurred. To upgrade its
workers, the company sends them to the local state school; with the Ministry of
Education, the company negotiated a special diploma; and the company
training center organises, with its own teachers, the training, in cooperation with
the local schools. Taking into account the symbolic value of the public
educational system in France —the “école de Jules Ferry,” the place where
égalité starts— this permanent negotiation between private and public actors is
all the more surprising.
3.4. Regional policies in perspective: public actors and private
goods
These examples have two things in common: why the policies failed and how
they got a second lease on life. They failed for a set of simple reasons. First of
all, being designed in faraway Paris, they were ill-conceived, mainly because
the technocratic policy-makers are simply unable to grasp all the necessary
information on the situation in the regions and then reorganise these into
policies. Secondly, once transferred and implemented, there are no social
actors in the regions both autonomous and strong enough to carry through the
policies without permanently having recourse to the central state. Hence the
                                                          
12 More clarity about the acronym  jungle of different types of diplomas and training certificates in France
can be found in the contributions to the workshop on “Négociation et construction des diplômes de
formation professsionelle: une confrontation Allemagne-France,” Aix-en-Provence, LEST, 22-24 May 1996.
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policies always come up short of their stated goals. The technology policy
misses its target because it lacks an institutional sounding board and the
training policy is hard to implement because the identities of the actors and
their organisational expression are at odds with the regional structure of the
training program. There are other examples that could be brought in as well,
such as, for example, the financial instruments which were designed throughout
the successive decentralisation reforms since the Second World War, and
which all turned out to be unable to bridge the gap between the financial world
and the SMEs.
These examples also share a basic architecture in explaining the ultimate
outcomes. In all of them, the end results are in fact measure-made for the large
firms. The technology policy discussed is undoubtedly the clearest case: it
failed miserably in its initial goals, but after the large firm PSA stepped in to
reorganise the policy in light of its own needs, it became a useful way to
upgrade the car company’s supplier base. The regional training program in
PACA of the second example, although arguably less of an initial failure, got a
boost after the large steel firm recovered it and streamlined it, entirely
congruent with its own reorganisation. In a parallel way to what was discussed
above, the existing public regional financial institutions were re-organised by the
large firm in order to tie its suppliers even more strongly into its own operations.
In the end, therefore, the regionalised production networks that the large firms
set up, and the regionalisation policies that the government initiated, ended up
reinforcing each other. One became, so to speak, an essential condition for the
other, and the successful development of one depended on the relative
success of the other.
Compare this with the outcomes of such policies in a country like
Germany.13 In Germany, labour unions and employers, both private actors,
discuss the structure of training policy. Employers make sure that the wishes of
the firms are taken into account, i.e. that the training actually will provide the
young people with jobs, while the labour unions make sure that the skills
obtained are general enough to be of value outside the company where the
training takes place (Streeck 1987). Consider training in this example a public
good (Olson 1967), and the situation is one where private actors create,
through the institutions that guide their strategies, public goods (Finegold and
Soskice 1988). The same is true of technology policy (Herrigel 1993). All firms
in a region contribute to institutions that allow the efficient transfer of
technological knowledge from large to small firms and across small firms.
Again: consider technology policy a public good, and the outcome is one in
which private actors produce public goods. What seems to characterise the
                                                          
13  The example is not entirely chosen at random: since Germany figures as an exemplar in almost all the
policy debates on the reorganisation of industrial, training, and regional policy (even in labour relations
reform), the comparison is especially instructive.
25
German political economy, is that its institutional make-up pushes private actors
to produce public goods.
This simple idea sheds a remarkable light on what appears to be going on
in France. The technology, training and financial policy are, in fact, all
government policies --policies by a very public actor indeed-- which, by virtue of
the way they are implemented and used in practice, seem to produce –with only
a slight sens of exaggeration– private goods for the large firms. The irony:
whereas the institutional setting in Germany forces private actors to produce
public goods, the institutional setting in France --the quintessential “strong-
state” country in the comparative political economy literature-- favours the
production of private goods through public policies.
4. Conclusion: modernisation without flexible specialisation
France’s economy has dramatically adjusted to the challenges of the 1980s.
Between 1980 and 1984, the country’s large manufacturing firms in the export
sector (with very few exceptions) went through a profound crisis. By 1990, most
of them were in good financial health, and all had fundamentally reorganised
their operations. They had reduced their workforces by between one third and
half during the decade, doubled productivity, introduced (extremely careful and
definitely very instrumental) team-based institutions of workers’ participation,
rethought the product design process and reorganised their links with suppliers.
This paper dealt with one aspect of this restructuring: the use that the large
firms made of the regional policies in order to accomplish the latter task. In the
1980s, two movements encountered each other against the background of the
large firms’ financial crisis. On the one hand, the decentralisation of production
which had started in the 1950s and accelerated after 1968; on the other, the
new challenges that manufacturing was facing in the entire developed world.
What emerged were the autarchical regional supplier networks found all over
France today, constructed around one large firm in the center --frequently also
the sole regional interface with Paris and/or the international economy-- and its
direct and indirect suppliers and sub-contractors. These regional industrial
structures exist in Bretagne, in Franche-Comté, around Lyon, Toulouse, in
Normandie, in short, essentially in every area with some industrial activity in
export sectors.
This system is without any doubt measure-made for the large firms.
However, since they also need to invest in the relationship with their suppliers
and subcontractors, the situation does not end up in straightforward
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exploitation. Rather, it is a strange mixture of authoritarianism and cooperation -
-probably best described as large firm paternalism. The large firm gets the
goods (and the services) it wants, in the desired quantity and quality, and at
exactly the moment it wants. The large firm also has seriously reduced its stake
in the design and production of those goods. In return for this, the large firm
helps the supplier to upgrade its manufacturing operations, to find partners and
thus grow, and to obtain finance (through the credit and newly created parallell
financial systems). Yet while these supportive activities allow the small firm to
upgrade technologically and even in principle to search for new markets, they
also tie the small firm more closely to the large manufacturing firm than in the
old arms-length relatonship.
There is a contradiction in all of this, of course: the creation of tighter links
between the large and the small firms, also potentially allows the small firms to
free themselves of the demands of the large firms. By upgrading the technology
base and the work organisation of their suppliers, the large firms open the door
for gradually more independent paths that the small firms can take. The policy,
for example, of imposing ISO 9000 certification upon suppliers not only serves
a purpose in the actual primary inter-firm relationship between large and small
firms. It also allows the supplier to position itself more favourably for
international clients. By tying the suppliers more closely, ironically, the large fim
has also created the conditions for more distance between them. How this
contradiction will ultimately be solved, is as of yet unclear. Will the relationship
ultimately stabilise around one of the two poles, will both parties design or find
new ways of dealing with it, or will the small firms simply never be aware of their
capacities to grow beyond the large firm’s world?
Stepping back for a moment, and feeding this discussion into the
comparative debate on regional economies alluded to above, this paper
suggests that regional development models are heavily influenced by the
“national” trajectory of the industrial model. It is not by chance that in response
to the economic turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s, French industry ends up being
organised in hierarchical regional economies; rather, this fits perfectly with the
broader postwar evolution of French industry, which was organised around and
pushed forward by the large firms, in a modernising coalition with the French
state --as Shonfield already pointed out in the mid-1960s. The imperatives of
international competition, or better perhaps, of the particular translation that
French economic and political elites gave to that crisis (see Weber 1990 for an
account) was in large measure shaped by the postwar experience, and thus
revolved around the large firm as the major agent of change. It was not
necessity, perhaps, which pushed French industry into this particular model, but
it was not entirely open either. The past is reflected in the present.
If one compares this with the stylised pictures of regional economic
development in Italy, Germany or the UK, one sees underneath the
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(discernable) commonalities, very different development patterns emerging. In
Italy, the industrial districts resurfaced after 1969, in large part conditioned by
the pre-existing social and political structures of these regional economies and,
perhaps, their “incomplete integration” into the dominant Italian development
model (Locke 1995). The German regional model (Herrigel 1993; Herrigel and
Sabel 1995) appears to be perfectly consistent with broader characteristics of
the German political economy, such as the role of strong employer associations
in forcing individual firms to contribute to public or club goods such as training
and technology transfer (Soskice 1996). And the absence of such employer
associations in the UK might help explain why mutually supportive regional
networks of firms never re-emerged after their demise at the end of the
previous century (Bagnasco and Sabel 1995). It is beyond the scope of this
paper to develop this argument in full, but the comparative analysis of the
development of regional economies in different capitalist countries, suggests
strong continuities between the development path followed in different countries
throughout the postwar period, and the trajectory of industrial adjustment after
1973. Different capitalisms, indeed, yield different forms of regional economic
development.
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